As the world and the U.S. Congress examine the Iran deal's fine print, the strategic large print is clear enough. "Obama wants this [deal] as a centerpiece of his legacy," an anonymous American diplomat is quoted as saying, "and he believes a peaceful Iran could be a bulwark against ISIS in the Middle East and the key to peace there."
The determination to engage enemies is a hallmark of Obama's foreign policy. With Iran, as with Cuba, he hopes to upend old strategies of isolation and sanctions, drawing rivals into a web of cooperation that ends up improving their behavior. It is Obama's version of regime change — the nonviolent advance of rational, modern norms because they are, well, rational, modern norms.
So the Iran deal is really a high-stakes, strategic bet. The agreement allows a decade of managed and monitored nuclear proliferation while Iran is engaged, first on security, but eventually across the range of the relationship. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran will emerge from this period as a nuclear threshold state, free from most sanctions, but hopefully, by that point, a "key to peace." The alternative, the president argues, is a path of isolation and confrontation that is likely to lead to war.
But is Obama's bet a reasonable one? Is he playing blackjack or the lottery?
In an interview with Ruth Marcus and me for the Washington Post Campaign Close-up series, Sen. Lindsey Graham describes Obama's approach to Iran as "dangerously naive." "I think he's misjudging what the Iranians want," Graham argued. "And the best evidence of what they want is what they're doing right now to destabilize the region without nuclear weapons."
There is no evidence that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is a Gorbachev-like figure. Iran gives every indication of being an aggressive, revolutionary power. It is rallying, arming and directing military forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The reported agreement to partly lift the arms embargo against Iran — a dramatic concession — must seem to America's Sunni allies and partners like de facto U.S. recognition of Iranian spheres of military influence across the region. Because it is.
Syria is a good example of the side effects of Obama's bet. During four years of civil war, America has hardly been a factor. This has resulted, in part, from habits of indecision that have added up to a policy of nonintervention. But American strategy in Syria has also shown increasing deference to Iran — and thus Iran's proxy, the Bashar Assad regime — in order to avoid confrontations that might disrupt nuclear negotiations.
The shift has been remarkable. Obama has gone from demanding in 2011 that Assad "step aside" to downplaying, earlier this year, the Syrian ruler's use of chlorine gas, since it has "historically not been listed as a chemical weapon." The fragile nuclear talks could not be jostled, at apparently any cost.