Three years after the last drama involving Russia, Ukraine and gas supplies to Europe, here we are again. Russia's monopoly supplier Gazprom cut off gas shipments to Ukraine on New Year's Day because of alleged unpaid bills, and by Jan. 7 no gas was moving across Ukraine to the European Union, either. Since the EU depends on Russia for a quarter of its natural gas, and 80 percent of that gas moves west through Ukrainian pipelines, that was no laughing matter.
Some big EU countries have strategic reserves of gas that will carry them through for weeks or even a couple of months, but in Bulgaria they were talking about rebooting a controversial nuclear plant before they run out of gas and everybody starts to freeze.
It's the former Soviet satellites that are most dependent on Gazprom's gas, because that's the way the pipelines ran in Soviet times. Some of them will run out very fast if their fellow EU members in western Europe do not share gas from their own strategic reserves. And Turkey (not an EU member) has turned to Iran to replace the missing Russian gas.
Only it's not really Russian gas at all: Most of it comes from the Central Asian state of Turkmenistan. And the dispute between Russia and Ukraine is not a normal commercial dispute (as both sides insist), nor is it some kind of Russian strategic move (as the believers in a new Cold War maintain). It is a thieves' quarrel.
Since it is Turkmenistan's gas, you would expect the Turkmens to sell it to European countries directly and pay transit fees to Russia and Ukraine for shipping it west through their pipelines. Instead, Gazprom secured long-term rights to Turkmenistan's gas by agreeing to pay it a rumored $340 per thousand cubic metres -- which is almost double the $179.50 that Ukraine actually paid in 2008.
So there is a real commercial issue in play, which is how much Ukraine will pay for its gas imports in 2009. Like other former Soviet possessions, Ukraine still gets gas at well below the market rate, and there is an annual round of haggling as the Russians try to move those countries up toward the rate that they charge their customers in central and western Europe.
Times are hard all over (Gazprom's shares have fallen by 76 percent since September) and Russia actually needs the money badly, so the pressure to raise the price of gas to subsidized ex-Soviet customers is higher than usual. But that is not what caused the gas to be cut off to Ukraine on Jan. 1 and to everybody else in Europe a week later. The reason for that is probably a murky internal fight over the division of the spoils.
Gazprom is an opaque organization with many leading Russian political figures on its board and its management committee, but it is a model of transparency compared to RosUkrEnergo, yet another middleman with the job (which clearly does not need doing) of buying gas from Gazprom and selling it to Ukraine. It was set up after the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian confrontation over gas, apparently at the insistence of Gazprom.