Do Democrats deserve re-election?

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It's often said that hindsight is 20/20. As far as politics goes, I've never believed it. Much punditry relies on what I've come to think of as the counterfactual fallacy. It goes like this: The party in power did X rather than Y. X didn't work out as well as Democrats or Republicans hoped. They clearly should have done Y.

We only get to run the tape once. We can never know if different decisions would have nudged us toward a better world or returned yet worse outcomes. But elections force an assessment of how the party in power has performed, despite the unknowability of other paths. And so, with Election Day nearing and voting underway all over America, I've been trying to work through my own answer to the question: How well did the Democrats do with the power they had, given the constraints they faced?

I find it useful to think back to the three interlocking promises Democrats ran on. First and foremost, they ran on bringing competent, concerned governance to COVID. Second, they ran on a Franklin Roosevelt-size legislative agenda, believing this a Great Depression-like moment of rupture that demanded a new vision of what the state could and must do. And they ran vowing to restore the soul of America, to reestablish a civic promise and communal decency that Donald Trump and the Republican Party never understood and regularly betrayed.

The COVID record is more mixed than I wish. Judged by what was promised in 2020, the Biden administration made remarkable strides. About 80% of Americans have had at least one vaccination, and anyone, anywhere in the country, can get shots and boosters with little effort and at no cost. Rapid tests rolled out slowly, but they are here now, and for a while the government would send them, free, to your door. The U.S. government bought up more Paxlovid than any other country, and it is now widely available. Masks are cheap and plentiful.

But judging by what was possible by 2022, even four of President Joe Biden's former COVID advisers wrote in the New York Times that they "are deeply dismayed by what has been left undone." The shift from emergency response to a new architecture for preparedness never came. At-home testing was never integrated into any kind of collective policy or even data reporting system. The funding for the government to provide tests directly lapsed, with little protest from the White House. Wastewater monitoring "remains limited, uncoordinated and insufficiently standardized for a robust national surveillance system," Biden's former advisers wrote. So much more could have been done to improve indoor air quality and to make it clear which buildings meet the higher standards.

After I criticized the Biden administration for failing to build on the successes of the Operation Warp Speed program, I heard from its COVID coordinator, Ashish Jha, that the White House was pushing Congress for $8 billion to create a Warp Speed-like program called COVID Shield for next-generation vaccines. But that push was quiet, and the administration committed itself to a bipartisan path that never opened. When Congress failed to provide the money, the administration never went public, much less turned to hardball measures. Biden could have refused to sign spending bills that didn't include the COVID preparedness money he sought. Democrats should have made this a must-pass provision of the Inflation Reduction Act; as the past few years have proved, little is worse for inflation than a raging pandemic.

The White House understands all of this. Jha is out there, even now, raising the alarm that current treatments are losing efficacy and future variants might evade them more easily. "Lack of congressional funding has made it difficult for us to replenish our medicine cabinet," he said Wednesday. "Because of a lack of congressional funding, the medicine cabinet has actually shrunk, and that does put vulnerable people at risk." Republicans deserve scorn for refusing to fund pandemic preparedness. But Democrats deserve blame for letting it sink to one priority among many.

To be fair, there's been much else on Democrats' agenda. The central tension of Biden's legislative strategy is that it paired ambitions of astonishing scale with congressional majorities that barely existed. The Senate, in a technical sense, saw no majority at all: It's a 50-50 split, and Democrats carry votes only because Vice President Kamala Harris has the constitutional authority to break ties. It is remarkable how much Democrats have done, even so.

There were two sides to Biden's long-term agenda: construction and care. The construction side — decarbonizing the country, building and repairing infrastructure, and investing in semiconductor production and scientific research — largely passed. And much of what passed is thrilling.

Trump was much mocked for infrastructure weeks that almost never resulted in new infrastructure. Biden and the Democrats have set the conditions for an infrastructure decade that could transform what America makes and how it's made. And to my surprise, Biden has put invention at the center of his policymaking, and while we cannot yet know what fruits that will bear, it may prove his most lasting legacy.

But the care side of Biden's agenda — universal pre-K, the expanded child tax credit, subsidies for child and elder care, paid leave — collapsed almost entirely (the sole exception being an increase to the subsidies under Obamacare). Was that inevitable?

This is murky territory, given the contradictory accounts that Biden and Sen. Joe Manchin have given of their negotiations. Was there truly a $1.8 trillion Build Back Better package that Manchin would have voted for? The Biden team thought they had a deal. Manchin says they never did. And at the end of the day, no one forced Manchin to decide child care wasn't worth doing and child poverty wasn't worth reducing. That so many in the Senate care so much for bridges and so little for bodies is a scandal.

Still, if you'd told me in 2020 that the next Democratic president would have a 50-50 Senate, with Manchin as the hinge vote, and a House margin of just a handful of members, I would not have predicted that the Democrats could pass more than $400 billion in climate investments or significant corporate tax increases or the most important infusion of cash and capital into scientific research in a generation.

Three criticisms are worth airing. One is that Democrats could have gotten more of the care agenda passed by refusing to allow a separate vote on the infrastructure bill. The Biden administration believes now, and believed then, that it didn't have the votes to tie the two together. That strategy ran an unacceptable risk of nothing passing. Given that Manchin proved perfectly willing to kill huge swaths of Biden's agenda and let the administration twist in the wind for month after month, I suspect they're right. But there's no way to truly know.

Another is that the American Rescue Plan was too large, and however well meaning the intentions behind it were, it was a handmaiden to inflation. I think the Biden administration erred on the right side of the ledger here. Unemployment is 3.5%. Workers got raises and stimulus checks. Poverty fell — sharply. The unemployed weren't forced into indigency. All of this is easy to dismiss now, but none of it was guaranteed. And with inflation running at 10% in Germany and Britain and 7% in Canada, I'm skeptical of explanations that make one piece of legislation passed in one country too central to the story.

I think the case is stronger that the Fed should've raised interest rates earlier and that Biden and the Democrats should've undershot economic support in the teeth of a pandemic that had frozen the global economy. Perhaps the rescue plan should've been built with more automatic stabilizers so aid rose as unemployment rose and vanished more quickly if it fell. But that's true in every economic downturn, and for reasons I don't fully understand, Congress refuses to learn that lesson.

That leaves a criticism that I think is fairer: The Biden administration and congressional Democrats have had a the-more-the-merrier approach to every piece of legislation they've pushed. One reason the expanded child tax credit expired quickly was that the rescue plan was stuffed with so many policies, all of which needed funding. One reason Build Back Better was hard to defend was that so much was jammed into the package that the main thing anyone knew about it was its $3.5 trillion price tag. The push for a package of democracy reforms was similarly unfocused. It included virtually everything anyone who was worried about voting rights or campaign financing could think of and yet would have done little to block the kind of electoral subversion that Trump and his supporters attempted in 2020 and appear to be gathering forces to attempt again in 2024.

Even when cornered, the Democrats kept trying to resist prioritization: Manchin said at the time that the White House lost his vote on Build Back Better by trying to keep the package intact and simply letting the policies expire earlier, in the hopes that they'd be extended en masse. He saw it as a gimmick that brought down the bill's price tag without bringing down its long-term cost, and he abandoned the process.

Whether that's truly what motivated Manchin is debatable. What's not debatable is that Democrats ran a very loose policy process. Compared with past administrations and Congresses I've covered, it felt as if Democratic leaders said yes to almost everything. Perhaps Democrats simply did not want to negotiate among themselves, knowing that Manchin or Sen. Kyrsten Sinema or the Republicans would cull on their behalf. But the result was many policies that were poorly or opaquely constructed and packages that were hard to explain or defend.

Biden always framed 2020 as a fight for America's soul, not just its steering wheel. This is harder to assess. I've never believed he thought he could knit together a divided nation. He's an optimist but not a fantasist. On a more literal level, he's done what he promised — he has run a low-drama, low-scandal White House and comported himself with dignity and grace.

But Biden has also run a relatively quiet administration. He gives comparatively few interviews, news conferences and speeches. He has filled the office Trump vacated but not the space Trump took up in the national conversation. I have argued that Biden's laid-back approach is, in some ways, a strategy: By letting Trump and his successors fill the airwaves, Biden and the Democrats remind their voters what's at stake. But this strategy runs deep risks. Biden's low-drama approach to leadership leaves room for Trump's high-drama antics.

Politics has not moved on from Trump, in ways that it might have under a president who created new political cleavages and alignments. Biden has not been a strong enough communicator or presence to make Trump seem irrelevant. To make this more concrete: I wonder whether Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren could have won in 2020. But if one of them had, I suspect politics would have reorganized around their concerns and conflicts and Trump would seem a more passé figure. I worry that Biden thinks too much about America's soul and not enough about its attention.

What can be said, I think, is this: Biden and the Democrats got a lot done, despite very slim majorities. They rolled out vaccines and therapeutics nationwide but we remain far from finishing the job on pandemic preparedness. They have run the government in a dignified, decent way, but we remain far from turning the page on Trump.

Soon, I'll take a closer look at what Republicans are promising to do if they are given the power to do it. Because these elections are more than just a referendum. They are a choice.

Ezra Klein joined New York Times Opinion in 2021. Previously, he was the founder, editor in chief and then editor-at-large of Vox; the host of the podcast "The Ezra Klein Show"; and the author of "Why We're Polarized." Before that, he was a columnist and editor at the Washington Post, where he founded and led the Wonkblog vertical.