Nearly three years after the invasion of Ukraine, a retrospective

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Three years ago, at the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I wrote an opinion piece in this newspaper giving my views on the event (tinyurl.com/sto-mazis). I think that a retrospective might be in order.

I was surprised by two developments: The first was the heroic defense of the Ukrainian people. To be sure, I expected them to fight, but I did not imagine how long and how successful their fight would be. I should mention here that the material support by many European countries and the U.S. has been critical, but at the end of the day it is the Ukrainian people who have stood their ground.

The other development that surprised me was the monumental ineptitude of the Russian Army. The Russian troops have been ill-trained, badly lead and ill-equipped. Here I should add the criminal behavior of the Russian Army in the occupied areas. For a regime that claimed the role of liberator, the widespread cases of war crimes point to different motives and aims.

There are other developments, though, that were expected. Three years into the conflict, Russia controls a large slice of Ukraine and it does not appear willing to give some of it back, let alone all of it. This was an easy prediction given the respective size of the two countries but also the fact that the West was willing to help Ukraine in any way except sending troops to fight.

Also, while sanctions have had an impact on Russia’s economy, too many countries — some of them NATO members — and companies have been violating the Western embargo and thus made it less potent.

There has also been a change in public opinion in parts of Europe but especially the United States. Short attention span, news fatigue and economic problems at home have many questioning the West’s commitment to Ukraine. Additionally, a political turn to the isolationist right in the U.S. brings into question future commitment by Ukraine’s major supporter.

I hesitate to speak of lessons learned because we humans seem to learn little from history, or we only learn the lesson we like; nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions. Europe, with all its wealth and European Union institutions, is not ready to lead, even when developments are happening at its borders. The Europeans have to make some decisions: Do they devote substantial amounts of money on defense, to the detriment of their social spending, or do they keep following the United States' lead, and be subject to the whims of whoever sits in the White House?

Russia, with all of its many problems, is still capable of inflicting heavy losses to medium-size countries near its borders, but its military capabilities are, for now, too weak to project power far away or to a more potent opponent.

Nuclear weapons are still important. While Vladimir Putin’s threats of using such weapons were just saber-rattling, a NATO attempt to intervene directly was a red line for Russia, and the West understood that.

There are also some questions that need to be answered. Did the U.S. use Ukraine as means to weaken Russia? (Both President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made comments to that effect). If that is the case, U.S. foreign goals were accomplished but at the expense of Ukraine, which was supported enough to degrade Russian capabilities but not enough to win. To be fair, Ukrainian victory could be accomplished only through U.S. direct involvement. In any case, if the scenario above is true, the U.S. very cynically pursued its goals and did not try to help end the war through negotiations, in which Ukraine would still lose territory, but not as much, and would avoid the devastation in infrastructure and people.

There is also another question that the rest of the world has to answer on an individual, country by country basis: Eighty years after the U.S. became a world power, its foreign policy is still subject to abrupt changes every four or eight years. Is the U.S. a reliable ally? Should countries under threat come to terms with whoever is against them rather than rely on U.S. pledges of support that might not last past a particular administration?

John Athanasios Mazis is a professor of Russian and European history at Hamline University.