On Russia, options are few; stakes are high

I am, in general, sympathetic to Russia, its grievances and some of its aims.

Starting in the mid-1990s the U.S. has been dismissive of Russian fears of encirclement and at times has treated Russia with contempt. Moscow's claims of mistreatment of Russian minorities in former Soviet Republics, now independent states, have some merit.

That said, what is happening now in Ukraine is inexcusable.

Vladimir Putin is a strongman/dictator and acts more and more in that mold. He has been muzzling the press and stifling political opposition for years, but more recently his methods have been openly brutal (the Alexei Navalny case is by far the most prominent but not the only one), a sign that he is not afraid of international reaction.

Putin's contempt for international opinion and order has increased as Russia has become less susceptible (though not immune) to economic pressures from abroad. The European Union is often unable to build a cohesive foreign policy; China is becoming a more potent international player, one antagonistic to the U.S. and friendly to Russia; and the U.S. is neither as strong as it used to be nor willing to confront a major power like Russia.

This last point has nothing to do with which party or politician controls the White House; it's a fact we need to accept. America is neither as rich nor as powerful as it was 30 years ago.

What I've found even more troubling is Putin's behavior in the recent crisis, which reveals a confident and arrogant individual. He spoke of diplomatic solution but it was clear he was not willing to give an inch. Indeed, as the crisis unfolded his demands increased. He indicated he was willing to talk, but clearly not to Ukraine, which he more or less dismissed.

Putin's troubling behavior culminated in the bizarre televised meeting with his security/foreign policy advisers. His claims that Ukrainians are not a different people from Russians is a view held, to my knowledge, by no scholar knowledgeable about the area and its people. The claim that Ukraine is not and cannot be an independent state is also wrong. Frankly, the visuals of the meeting were of the kind we have seen before coming from Saddam Hussein when he was all-powerful and enjoyed televising meetings in which he harangued and terrorized subordinates.

Finally, Putin's attack on Ukraine reveals the character and current state of mind of the man. He feels all-powerful and thus does not even pretend that his army was provoked (a familiar trick by dictators before they invade another country) and he chooses to attack Ukraine on many fronts rather than limiting his efforts to the territories he claims are pro-Russian. Clearly his goal is either to take over and incorporate Ukraine to Russia, to install a puppet regime in Kyiv, or to take possession of extensive parts of the country and leave Ukraine as a rump state.

Unfortunately, the U.S. can do little in the short run. In 2014, the Star Tribune published my piece, "Ukraine: A fight we can't win and Russia can't lose." That was a time when Putin had more modest goals, but my "we can't win" argument is still valid militarily.

Direct military action by NATO is out of the question. If Russia occupies large parts or all of Ukraine, there will be resistance and maybe providing resistance fighters with weapons will do some good. But at the end of the day our only option is sanctions of the kind that have never been tried before — severe or even total economic restrictions and isolation of the regime.

This, of course, is easier said than done. Such sanctions will hurt us and, even more, our European allies. Can we face huge price increases at the gas pump and inflation for a long period of time?

The alternative is for us to give Russia a stern lecture and then go back to business as usual.

The whole world is watching.

John Athanasios Mazis is a professor of history at Hamline University.