Architect of the U.S. policy of "containing" the Soviet Union during the Cold War, George F. Kennan was one of this country's preeminent diplomats, historians, and public intellectuals.
In "Kennan," Frank Costigliola, a professor of history at the University of Connecticut, author of "Roosevelt's Lost Alliances," and editor of "The Kennan Diaries," provides an informative, clear-eyed, and compelling (if at times repetitious) account of a brilliant, conflicted, egotistical and emotionally volatile man, whose life spanned almost the entire 20th century.

In his personal and professional life, Costigliola demonstrates, Kennan tried to bridge the gap between the Victorian and modern worlds he inhabited. Obsessed with the death of his mother two months after he was born, his inability to establish a close relationship with his distant father, and marital difficulties, Kennan craved succor from a substitute parent, desirable women and the "virile, fertile" Russian people.
Impressed with the theories of Sigmund Freud, however, Kennan concluded that neither individuals nor nations could fully reconcile the sexual freedom, creativity and emotion of Eros, with the duty, discipline and cold rationality of civilization.
Although Costigliola does not, of course, excuse Kennan's xenophobia, racism and misogyny, he attributes his prejudices to formative experiences in predominantly white Milwaukee, WASP Princeton and Eastern Europe. Costigliola notes as well that Nazi atrocities against Jews did not seem to reach "deep into Kennan's heart."
Kennan's "Long Telegram" to the State Department in 1946 and his article under the pseudonym "X," which was published in "Foreign Affairs" in 1947, Costigliola reminds us, laid out in detail the grand strategy of containment. And they produced dream jobs for Kennan, as founding director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and deputy commandant of the National War College in Washington.
Although Kennan later denied that his proposals necessitated a military buildup or a likely military confrontation, Costigliola makes a persuasive case that he had simplified the Soviet threat "to the point of distortion" and "helped create the monster of a militarized Cold War."
In any event, Kennan's support for negotiations with the Russians in the 1950s (and beyond) contributed to his loss of influence in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.