The global battle over expertise and elitism

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The zig-zagging between right and left extremes in the European elections and the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that executive agencies have no special competence in the statutory process — reversing the famous Chevron decision of 1984 that they do — share one thing in common: a reaction to elitist decisionmaking that increasingly involves science and science advisers.

I want to argue that, despite the concerns, science is still the only source of policy that works, but that we need a better way of delivering it.

For some time, sociologists have realized that in a technological society it is the recognition of risk that confers political power, because most of us do not understand the problems arising from technology and how they should be addressed. So we become dependent on experts. But that gives them powers that have not been legitimized by the democratic process.

This is where the executive agencies (EAs) in the U.S. and directorates-general of the European Union Commission come into focus. They employ specialists and have advisory committees of science experts.

What makes science successful in addressing policy problems is not just that it is based on evidence carefully collected under controlled conditions, systematically addressing inevitable uncertainties in a complex world, but that the results have to be repeatable in public. It is this requirement for repeatability that confronts the inherent bias in us all (including scientists) and that makes it the only source of knowledge that delivers understanding that works. It has delivered spectacularly in generating the new technology and addressing the risks that are arising from it.

But as important is the recognition of a difference between facts and what we do with them. Decisions depend on preferences and values. Science has nothing to say about these. In a democracy, those affected should be making decisions.

Yet federal agencies and directorates-general often make rules that combine both facts and preferences, and this can lead to feelings of exclusion and charges of elitism. Technocracy turns people off and has been a major source of populism — for example, leading to an abandonment of the Democratic Party by working-class voters in the U.S. and to the E.U. elections veering right then left in France, and right in Italy and Germany, with the anti-E.U. populists making gains in the E.U. Parliament in the 2024 elections and contributing to Britain leaving the E.U. earlier.

In the U.S., the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 was an attempt to tame technocracy by requiring broad consultation and for recommendations from the committees to be adopted by the head of the agencies — with connection to Congress and the president and so with some democratic standing. Yet the process is somewhat complex and contorted, so there is a lot of opportunity for misunderstanding.

In this context, Chevron gave primacy to the agencies. There is an obvious distinction between if the science can be used under statutes (a matter for the courts) and how the science can be used in solving problems (a matter for the experts). And at a lower level, the courts are used to resolve scientific uncertainties. Whether judges know enough or are independent enough to do this is open to debate. Neither Chevron nor the recent decision address these issues.

Under the E.U. Treaties, the commission has sole responsibility for suggesting new policy and implementing that which is adopted by the council and parliament. It has translated the E.U. Treaty requirement for use of best available science in policy into an array of expert committees. These are advisory committees, but generally the advice goes as opinions to the commission for implementation. Both the commission and experts, unlike the council and parliament, are non-elected, and this been a source of dissatisfaction. There is a European Court of Justice that certainly can review the specific implementation of E.U. law but not the general powers of the commission.

So how do we combine expert advice with decisionmaking in a way that does not undermine democracy? There are no silver bullets. But there are features that would facilitate better governance if they were implemented in the United States and the European Union.

First, we all need to be better aware of how science works. This will come down to a better education in science at all levels, kindergarten to college. That education needs to be about understanding the process more than the particular outcomes in physical, biological and social sciences. That will take time.

Second, there needs to be more separation of the evidence-based process and using that to form rules — but with care; when the separation is too great, the science can become irrelevant.

Third, there needs to be clarity about the source of evidence — that it has satisfied the repeatability criterion with uncertainties made transparent.

Fourth, reports describing rules in the U.S. Federal Register and opinions delivered to the European Commission need to be more intelligible. They are generally so technical that even experts not in the fields have difficulty following them. There should be a statutory requirement to deliver non-technical pieces that can be found easily and read by the public.

Fifth, those who make decisions should be obvious and be accountable to the democratic process. The executive agencies in the U.S. have it through the Administrative Procedure Act, but the European Commission does not and surely needs to pay more attention to this if it is to become less elitist.

Sixth, recognizing that courts have limitations in a risk society calls for a special branch of the judiciary with skills that can handle technical issues, much as there is for patent laws.

Like it or not, science and experts are going to play an ever more prominent role in government as we embrace the technological era. To make technocracy work for democracy, governments need to review urgently the role of all the institutions as outlined here. Otherwise, misunderstanding and frustration will fuel more populist reactions.

Peter Calow is a professor in the University of Minnesota’s Humphrey School of Public Affairs.