An awful tragedy recently occurred. A 40-year-old man, Leneal Frazier, was killed after being hit by a police car engaged in a chase. We would all feel as Frazier's grieving family must — that no pursuit was worth the death of our loved one.
But it's not the first time a police chase has gone awry with fatal consequences, and it's likely not to be the last unless there are significant changes in the rules.
Ten years ago, as a district judge, I dealt with a similar tragedy. Three separate police vehicles chased a 15-year-old driving a stolen car. Although the police terminated the chase when they lost sight of the car, the stolen vehicle continued to speed down busy Lake Street, broadsiding another car, killing a young mother, injuring her child and devastating her husband.
Only tragedy resulted from the incident. The 15-year-old driver was caught, certified in juvenile court to stand trial as an adult and sent to adult prison. He caused a death and, at a tender age, suffered the adult consequence. I know of the heart-rending issues involved because I was the sentencing judge.
The husband sued the six officers involved in the chase, the Minneapolis Police Department and the city. Coincidentally, the civil case was also assigned to me. It wasn't an assignment I relished. I dismissed the husband's claims because they were barred by the doctrine of official immunity. I didn't like the result, but it was correct under the applicable law.
I was reminded of my decision when I read a Star Tribune article recounting the call by one activist for the attorney general to review the recent case for possible criminal prosecution against the officer.
For some good to come out of the tragedy of Frazier's death, you have to understand the law and how it might be changed. Official immunity attaches to the actions of a public official, including a police officer, when the actions result from the exercise of a discretionary act — one that requires individual judgment in carrying out the person's duties. In a police chase, the official duty usually relates to the decision to initiate the pursuit and whether to terminate it. Policies that permit an officer to weigh a variety of factors in making the pursuit decision are discretionary and therefore ordinarily immunize the police, and the city, from liability (unless there is evidence that the conduct was intentional or malicious).
In 1992 in Pletan v. Gaines, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that the factors to be considered by an officer in deciding whether to engage in and continue a pursuit occur under emergency circumstances and therefore provide an officer with little time to consider and reflect. The community, the court explained, cannot expect its officers to make a difficult judgment and then to second-guess them — even if the consequence is tragic.
